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Joshua Davis is a senior Philosophy major with a minor in Computer Science from Las Vegas, NV. Upon graduating from Xavier, he plans to pursue graduate studies in philosophy with a focus on ethics. Davis’ research interests include philosophy of religion, ethical theory, and applied interests. He also has computer science research interests in C++ programming. Davis is currently involved in a research project with the Computer Science department which is examining “ways in which life can be eased or improved through the use of computer science.” Davis’ initial involvement with this project began as his senior thesis for senior comprehensives.

The Morality of Special Relationships

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Abstract

This essay originated as a senior thesis paper, attempting to address the problem various normative ethical theories had when put in the realm of “special relationships.” Special relationships are the relationships people have with family and close friends, which often have special duties or rights associated with them. Furthermore, the duties and rights associated with special relationships are often very different and more complex than those associated with strangers. The focus of the thesis was to see whether or not the various normative ethical theories within philosophy could be applied to special relationships without compromising the unique aspects of special relationships, but at the same time maintaining the core values of any particular ethical theory. The essay concludes that certain theories can be adapted to better suit special relationships; however a majority could not, at least without compromising either the core ideals of the theory, or some of the defining features of a special relationship. There are several implications that can be made, depending on the light in which one views the conclusion. One is that a new normative ethical theory needs to be established which takes into account the key features of special relationships. Another could be that the more powerful ethical theories are those that can be adapted to special relationships, without losing the integrity of either. Finally, a more radical implication could be that people need to reassess the concept of special relationships and the rights and duties associated with them.

Key Terms:
- Ethical Theories
- Special Relationships
Introduction

While the choices people make in life often appear to be black and white, in actuality the choices often have such unforeseeable effects that at best people are choosing between lighter and darker shades of grey. This becomes even more apparent in the realm of morality, where there are countless perspectives for each moral decision made. Thankfully, there are a variety of ethical theories which help to direct the differing thoughts regarding moral conflicts, which give individuals not only the guidelines for judging their actions, but also the guidelines for determining which actions to take. Nevertheless, there will always be a grey area in what appears to be a black and white decision. When it comes to morality, special relationships are one type of grey that become very apparent when one realizes exactly what a special relationship is.

Special relationships are “special” for a very important reason: the rules that govern interaction between individuals within a special relationship often differ vastly from, if not contrast with, the rules that govern interaction among members of the general community, or strangers. Intuitively, the same would apply to the moral realm as well, and this intuition is exactly what is being pursued in this paper. While various ethical theories prove to be adequate in assessing moral interaction among strangers, few, if any, can sufficiently address special relationships. In order to understand why some ethical theories fall short, this essay first establishes what exactly a special relationship is. Once this understanding has been established, this essay will discuss the consequentialist theories of direct-act utilitarianism and indirect-act utilitarianism, as well as the nonconsequentialist theories of contractarianism, kantianism, and libertarianism. From there an application and analysis of the theories to the special relationships will show how they may fall short in addressing special relationships.

Special Relationships

There are a wide variety of special relationships, though not all may appear to be very special. Co-workers, fellow students, and bosses and employees stand in a special type of relationship to each other that may call for a unique set of rules governing interaction within them. However, it’s true that some of these special relationships may not call for anything other than showing a bit more respect than usual. That being said, there are also special relationships that require an entirely different set of rules. These usually fall into the category of familial relationships and friendships. Specifically, though, this essay focuses on the parent-child relationship model and the close friend relationship model. Both of these relationship models, as well as a majority of others, are role-directed relationships, which implies duties and rights for all parties involved.

The parent-child relationship is viewed as one of the most important relationships a person can have. Even in normal conversation, a child’s behavior and performance is often directly associated with the child’s parents and upbringing. This role is normally filled by the biological parent, however that is not necessarily so. In fact, a biological parent may fail at fulfilling the role, while a friend of the family may be far better suited for it. Similarly, the close friend relationship is one involving a friend who is viewed almost as a sibling; a role which has a special mix of duties tied to it. At times when there may be familial decisions to be made, close friends may not have any weight in the final decision; however they may be consulted for their opinion or advice. This will not be the case with every person who is a friend though, which makes the close friend relationship so unique.

However, even with an understanding of what special relationships are, there is still the matter of distinguishing various ethical theories from each
other, as well as understanding what they may be. In the next section, the ethical theories will be highlighted and explained, followed by an application to special relationships. It is only after being applied to special relationships that it can be shown if, how, and why the ethical theories fall short of sufficiently accommodating special relationships.

**Ethical Theories**

In characterizing the ethical theories, the traditional division between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist will be maintained. In general, consequentialist views focus on the outcome of any given action. In other words, the driving force behind the consequentialist branch can be summarized by saying “the ends justify the means.” The predominately consequentialist views are included in both divisions of utilitarianism: direct-act utilitarianism and indirect-act utilitarianism. While distinct, both have a common thread running through them: focusing on the quantity of un/happiness produced to determine what is morally right or wrong, which is why both versions of utilitarianism fall under the consequentialist branch of normative ethical theories.

The direct-act utilitarianism theory argues that an action is morally right if it produces more positive consequences than any alternative action. However, due to this emphasis on positive actions, the direct-act variation faces difficulties that the indirect version does not. Particularly when two moral considerations come into conflict, the direct variation has no method of determining which should be followed. Additionally, there are many moral intuitions which people have that are contrary to what the theory would have one do. For example, bringing about the maximum happiness may contradict reprimanding a child’s behavior.

At first glance, moral behavior being judged by whatever produces the most happiness seems ideal. Initially it seems in tune with many people’s moral intuitions. Actions such as giving to the poor, helping a person in need, or sharing one’s belongings, would all be justified as morally right by this theory. However, there are other implications. Though this theory seems in tune with people’s moral intuitions, there are many with which the theory clashes. For example, within this theory a parent would be viewed as immoral for pursuing a selfish endeavor by means of benefitting their children exclusively, rather than pursuing some other course of action to benefit the general community.

The indirect variation avoids these issues by splitting the thought process into two levels: the critical level and the practical level. The critical level is where the actual moral rules are made and where they are scrutinized in terms of how good/bad they might be. Not everyone should be assigned to this level of thinking. In fact, a vast majority only operate on the practical level. The practical level is the level that strictly follows the moral rules. Similar to that of a parent-child relationship, the parent operates at the critical level, deciding what is best for the child and what the rules should be. Meanwhile, the child operates at the practical level, asking what the rules are in order to follow them, but never asking what the rules should be.

The strongest aspect of the indirect variant is the simplicity behind it. At the practical level, one would never have the conflict that other theories face. In all cases one should appeal to the moral laws in order to guide his or her actions. However, while it is true that within the parent-child model, parents often tend to know what is best for their children, even if they choose not to explain what that may be, there are also bad parents who either do not know what is best or simply do not act with their child’s interest at heart. This is the main issue that the indirect variant faces. What happens when
the two levels clash? Or worse, what issues arise if the critical level assigns rules for the practical level to follow that are bad rules? On the practical level, one would be obligated morally to conform to the rules of the critical level, even though the rules may be bad, possibly to the point of being contradictory to the overarching utilitarian goal.

Nonconsequentialist theories differ from consequentialist ones in that the motives of an action, as well as other factors involved, impact the moral verdict of an action. The three theories that will be emphasized are contractarianism, kantianism, and libertarianism. While the outcome of an action is important, each of these theories takes into consideration more than just the outcome when guiding and judging moral actions.

Moral contractarianism views the rules of morality as the result of a contractual agreement. The emphasis is on whether or not one would hypothetically consent to a set of rules or principles for dictating any given action. There are specific conditions of agreement, most importantly that the one giving consent be free and rational. Furthermore, one must also be willing to consent to having the same action done to oneself. Other versions expand on the conditions required to give consent, including mutual acceptability, equal concern/respect, and prudential rationality. In this view, an action is said to be morally right if it is consistent with or required by rules to which one were to give hypothetical consent while fulfilling each of these conditions.

When appealing to contractarianism, a person is also tasked with identifying the specific “contract” (moral rules) with which all involved parties would agree. This implies that both parties benefit to some extent, more often than not equally. However, when identifying each individual contract various restraints/conditions are imposed. This can become an issue as too many constraints can make such a theory difficult, if not impossible, in practical use. For example, sometimes a moral decision may require that some party involved does not have their best interests pursued, though the action itself is morally correct.

Kantianism introduces the distinction between a hypothetical and categorical imperative as the basis of moral judgment, as well as the distinction between prudence and morality. Hypothetical imperatives are actions one should take under normal circumstances, actions which are most prudent. On the other hand, there are categorical imperatives, which are the actions one should take even if they are not the most prudent choices and are tied more closely with moral decisions rather than what is best for one’s self.

Based on the distinction of prudence and morality previously presented, in most situations it is acceptable to act solely out of prudence. However, when questions of morality arise, moral obligation always takes precedence over prudence for one’s self. This method avoids having one’s personal interests or considerations interfere with how one should act morally. So even though someone may have been able to get away with stealing (for whatever reason, good or bad) from another person, it is still morally wrong and should not be done.

Libertarianism has property rights as its core. Additionally, it makes a clear distinction between morality and ethics. The libertarian view is that only those rules deriving from the right to liberty itself are moral rules. This includes personal autonomy, self-ownership, and individual sovereignty, as well as others. Ethics, on the other hand, is the set of guidelines which a person/group of people uses to guide their lifestyles. Ethics is subordinate to morality, but is also protected by morality, as everyone has a right to have their own ethics, so long as it doesn’t conflict with morality. Libertarianism also highlights the difference between negative rights and positive rights,
asserting that the ‘fundamental rights’ are all negative in nature, not positive.9

When following the libertarian ethical theory, there are two main questions to be asked. The first, and more important of the two, is to ask, “would an action violate morality/a person’s right?” The second question to ask is “does a person’s actions conform to his/her own code of ethics?” If the answer to both questions is favorable, then the action is morally permissible; however, if not, then the action is morally wrong. Libertarianism focuses heavily on rights and duties, and as such, anyone appealing to this ethical view is also likely to have a strong interest in personal rights. Yet there are still issues that arise. One such issue is the conflict between doing what is morally right according to the theory and doing what one intuitively feels is morally right. For example, even though withholding the property of another person is necessary to ensure their safety, libertarianism would require that one return the property to that person.

**Applications to Special Relationships**

However, it is not enough to simply identify these ethical theories: each theory must be applied to a case of special relationships to see if they are relevant, let alone sufficient, in serving as guides for moral behavior. The situation that will be examined is a case from director Nick Cassavetes’s *John Q*10, which was modeled after a real life situation. In short, a father finds out his child has been unintentionally injured during a sports game, which results in the child needing a heart transplant. However, the father faces financial hardships due to reduced hours at work (as a result of an economic downturn, rather than his own inability). Even with the father’s level of health insurance and his convincing the heart surgeon to waive fees, the father still does not have enough to cover the operation. So as a final measure, the father holds the hospital’s staff hostage until his child can be treated.11 In this example, the question is: how should the father behave according to each of the previously discussed ethical theories? Therefore, the theories will be analyzed as if the film’s action had not yet taken place, and the father is reflecting on each theory in order to guide his actions. An argument will be constructed on behalf of each ethical theory. After reviewing each argument, it can be determined whether they are with special relations or not.

Often times direct act utilitarianism is viewed as too complicated due to the calculations required to do the theory justice. However, in this situation the calculations can be simplified by accepting a few assumptions. The first two assumptions would be that everyone who is uninjured would be happy and, conversely, that those who are injured would be unhappy. These assumptions are both intuitive, as pain and pleasure are commonly associated with happiness and unhappiness. For the sake of argument, it would also be wise to assume that everyone has the same number of family members and friends, as there is no way to know otherwise.

With these assumptions in mind, the protagonist’s situation could be analyzed as such: the optimal solution would be to treat his child, while not harming anyone, making everyone happy. However, this route has already been closed off. Therefore, the next most optimal solution would be to treat either the child while harming the fewest possible people, or to not treat the child and not harm anyone. However, the case isn’t such that the father holds a select few hostage in exchange for his child’s treatment, but rather that he holds the entire hospital’s staff hostage. So the situation has become one where it’s either the happiness of one child and his family and friends or the happiness of an entire hospital’s staff as well as their family and friends. Within a direct act utilitarian view, the decision is clear; the father should not have held the hospital hostage, because the happiness of one individual is not worth the
same as the happiness of a much larger group of individuals.

A direct act utilitarian view would call into question whether or not the parent was pursuing the well being of the most people or just one particular individual. Furthermore, this view would distinguish between an inadequate outcome and a morally wrong outcome, as the two may clash depending on the perspective. When the focus remains on the moral decision to be made, with personal bias set aside, then no matter how difficult the choice may be the choice is clear. While the father may wish to help his child, the morally right action to take would be not holding the hospital hostage, despite whatever undesirable consequences may result. Forcing one to consider the maximum well being helps avoid the pitfalls of individual/group favoritism that plagues the history of nearly every nation.

Indirect act utilitarianism is less complicated in that it worries less about the moral outcome, but instead focuses on where the laws are being followed correctly, at least on the practical level. If it is granted that following the laws of one’s country, provided they are moral, is morally right, then in any situation, disobeying said laws is morally wrong. On the practical level it makes the situation very simple from the beginning; though it may be true that the father has an excellent reason for holding the hospital hostage, the laws say that the action is a morally wrong one to take, and as such, the father should not take it. What about on the critical level? Would accepting and enforcing the laws that protect citizens’ right to life optimize the chances for a positive outcome? Most would agree that they do, as it is those same laws that protect people from harm in normal situations. Therefore, even after reexamining the laws at the critical level, one would not be inclined to change them. Furthermore, because the laws are not unjust or corrupt, disobedience at the practical level is never warranted and should be dealt with via punishment. Either way, according to indirect act utilitarianism the father should not, hold the hospital hostage.

The indirect act utilitarian view would speak along similar lines. The question isn’t whether or not one wants to be a good parent, but rather whether one wants to be a good moral agent. If the father is not concerned with being a good moral agent, then it is unlikely he would have questioned his moral actions in the first place. Yet, if the father is trying to maintain his sense of morality, then by his own standards he would have to act in accordance with certain moral duties. Again, the issue isn’t about proper parenting but rather about being moral.

Contractarianism differs greatly from either variant of utilitarianism. Arguably, no action that the father could take in the situation would ever be morally justifiable because holding the hospital staff violates one of the basic conditions of the theory: that all parties involved be free. A similar conclusion would be reached by analyzing the idea prior to action. Would every member of the staff agree to a rule which allows them to be held hostage so that a child may be treated? While some may, a majority probably would not. Moreover, it could be safely assumed that there are other people being treated in the hospital as well, including other parents trying to help their children. Would they agree to be taken hostage for some stranger to get free treatment after they have worked and waited to treat their own child? Or if the roles were switched (based on the Kantian variant), would the parent intending to hold the hospital hostage be willing to be taken hostage instead? All things considered, contractarianism would not view this course of action as morally right by any means.

A contractarian would empathize with the tough situation the father was placed in; nevertheless, the father would be morally wrong for imposing an arrangement on people who in normal circumstances would never agree to live by it. Would that make the father a bad parent? Most would agree that it doesn’t, as there are many
times when constraints prevent parents from achieving certain benefits for their children. This is not to say that those parents who do not care for their children at all are excused, but a father who has tried all options possible would not be held blameworthy, even in such an extreme case.

The effectiveness of kantianism will be based on whether or not protecting one’s child is viewed as a prudent action or a moral obligation. By assuming that protecting one’s child is a moral obligation, one would have some weight in defending the action taken by the father. Not risking one’s freedom or life would be the prudent choice and therefore be considered a hypothetical imperative; however, it would be trumped by the categorical imperative of protecting one’s child, which would permit one to take the necessary actions in order to fulfill one’s moral duty. The problem arises when one tries to decide which categorical imperative has more weight: protecting one’s child or respecting other people’s right to life. If protecting one’s child has more moral weight than the duty of respecting other people’s right to life, then it opens up the possibility of abuse. But if instead, respecting other people’s right to life has more moral weight than protecting one’s child, then the father has a conflict between his parental and moral duties.

A kantian proponent would argue that protecting one’s child is not a moral obligation, but rather a prudent action. By arguing this route, it avoids the issue of a conflict between a parent’s role and the moral duties one has. Yes, it may result in an outcome that is least prudent for the individual; however, everyone is someone’s child so if exceptions were allowed for parents and children on the basis of what was the more prudent choice for the two, then abuse could easily occur.

At first glance libertarianism also appears to lend strength to defending the father’s action in the scenario. Due to the distinction between a code of ethics and morality itself, the father could be justified in having a code of ethics where the health and well being of his child takes precedence over any of his other concerns. There is still an issue, however, with one’s code of ethics conflicting with morality. According to libertarianism, at a minimum one’s code of ethics must be consistent with morality, if not subordinate to it. Additionally, one’s code of ethics is protected by morality so long as it does not interfere with anyone else’s fundamental rights. Taking people hostage interferes with everyone’s fundamental rights though, which means that an ethics of pursuing the well being of one’s child using this means would not be protected by morality, nor would it be the morally right choice to make.

A libertarian would argue that while it may be possible to concede one’s rights to another in accordance with their code of ethics, it is too much of a leap to assume that others would also be willing to do so. If the scenario was confined to a voluntarily associated group of those who shared a similar code of ethics in which sacrificing of one was excusable to save another, then there would be no problem with this situation. However, libertarianism stresses liberty and property rights, which includes autonomy. If the father interferes with the autonomy of the countless people in the building without prior knowledge of the ethics those individuals abide by, he is violating morality. It becomes less of an issue of what the father is doing and instead becomes an issue of how it was done.

**Criticisms and Solutions**

Given the five ethical theories discussed, and their applications to the *John Q* scenario, the focus now shifts to the main topic: are any of the ethical theories adequate when applied to special relationships? According to each of the theories, the father would have taken an immoral action by holding the hospital hostage. Yet, many would agree that there is at least some moral justifiability
in what the father was actually attempting to do, setting aside that it is the intuitive choice for a parent to make. As presented in the movie, the father was praised by many bystanders for taking such drastic measures to treat his child, even while police were trying to ensure the protection of the hostages. That so many would agree about the justifiability of the father’s actions in such a controversial situation appears to be in direct conflict with general moral intuition, suggesting that there is something other than just a general moral principle at work. Furthermore, if many would agree that there is moral justification for the father’s action, and thereby disagree with the moral verdict of the various ethical theories, the question becomes “where do the theories fall short?”

The greatest inadequacy several of the theories face is that they don’t consider the uniqueness of the parent-child relationship (or special relationships at all). Even the ones that do are very rigid, to the point where the little flexibility that is offered is implausible for most situations. Yes, there has to be a way to prevent abuse; however, that need not be through such a strict ethical theory that does not acknowledge special circumstances. In order to accomplish this task, it would be most helpful to look at the theory which came closest to having any sort of adequate response to the father’s conflict, without necessarily having to compromise the father’s duties.

While it is true that libertarianism presents a few problems with the parent-child relationship, it still can offer a promising starting point for addressing this type of special relationship, as well as other types. Children are such individuals that even though they cannot be considered property, they often invoke responsibilities and duties analogous to those of ownership. It is not uncommon for people to speak of children as if they were property (for example, referring to children as “one’s own”), whether it be in defense of their own actions regarding their children or in response to the actions of others towards them. This sense of ownership is similar to the type of ownership an inventor might feel after creating some new product. Not only are children spoken of as property, but they are also completely dependent upon their parents for an extended time period.

These are the problems with the libertarian perspective, because while children are not property, nor are they owned, they also cannot direct their own lives or claim rights and duties. The reason for this is because children lack autonomy or any other capacity to direct their own lives. However, that does not mean they should be left alone or neglected. To the contrary, many parents not only feel obligated to their children, but also have actual obligations to their children, regardless of if they live up to them. In order to resolve this, the libertarian would have to accept a new code of ethics, which involves some restrictions or even omissions of certain aspects of morality.

What would this new code of ethics consist of, given the libertarian perspective? If the scope is widened to focus on special relations as a whole, then there would need to be some way of defining which type of special relationship was being dealt with. Once that was established, the next step would be to define the roles for the relationship. These first two steps are important because they would be the primary ones in defining the code of ethics at work. Because the various types of special relationships are distinct from each other, the differing general ethical theories are even more likely to be at odds with at least one type of special relationship. Using libertarian theory as a basis and allowing a code of ethics to be tailored to the individual special relationship can better guide moral inquiries.

The next step would be to reconcile the rights and duties of the given roles with morality. Normally, morality would have more weight than role-based
ethical rights or duties; however, because of the nature of special relationships, the ethical rights and duties often are a decisive factor in decisions and how they are viewed morally. It would be naïve to discount the impact the roles have in moral decisions among special relationships, and as such, they need to be weighed just as much as other moral duties. Nevertheless, morality shouldn’t be completely subordinate to special relations. Ideally, the occasions when morality becomes subordinate to the obligations of a special relationship should be specific and rare, as well as highly scrutinized.

The situations in which it might be permissible for a member of a special relationship to overlook a moral duty will almost always center around the health of the other. This could include mental, physical, or even social health, but it must always be for the actual good of the individual, not simply what they want most or feel is best for themselves. For example, a close friend is planning to take a course of action that is likely to endanger himself, and while it may not be the wisest thing for him to do, arguably he is not in violation of any moral duty. That being said, this friend is still entitled to his right to personal autonomy and constraining him from carrying out any action that is not in violation of another person’s rights is morally wrong. Nevertheless, it would be a situation in which one’s obligation to have a close friend’s interests in mind would take precedence over that friend’s right to personal autonomy with the intent of endangering himself.

While it is hard to imagine anyone arguing against the above situation, there are also many situations in which even an obligation of a special relationship is not a sufficient reason to go against one’s moral duty. So what would the limitations be? Violating the rights of any person outside of the special relationship is something that needs to be restricted so that even if the case arises where it is necessary, it would not cause any harm (physical, social, or mental) to the person being violated for which that person being violated would have to suffer. It is important to distinguish suffering from a simple inconvenience, as almost any violation of right will result in an inconvenience. However, a person might not suffer for every violation of rights. Furthermore, violating the rights of a person outside of the special relationship should only be a final resort when no other options are available. These two limitations, along with the condition that the violation is essential to the health of a member of the special relationship, make up the basis for a member of a special relationship to violate their moral obligations.

With these ideas in mind, a second look at the scenario presented earlier would be the best way to apply this new code of ethics. The father has now found out his child has been injured during a sports game, unintentionally, which results in the child needing a heart transplant. Sadly though, the father has been facing financial hardships due to reduced hours at work. Even with the father’s health insurance, in addition to having convinced the heart surgeon to waive fees, the father still would not have enough to cover the hospital and medical care costs. So as a final measure, the father holds the hospital’s staff hostage until his child can be treated.

How does this new code of ethics view this situation? Well, firstly the relationship in question is that of a parent-child, meaning the child is completely dependent on the parent. Additionally, the father has many intuitive ideas behind his actions for the sake of his son, which are motivating his behavior. While the father tries many alternatives, it is fair to guess that he did not exhaust all possible (realistic) alternatives before violating the rights of those in the hospital. If this is the case then the father’s action was immoral, not because of what he did but because he did not use that method as a last result. Had this truly been the last resort, then taking hostages in order for this procedure to be performed would have been permissible. However, if the situation was drawn
out to an extreme, then the father going so far as to kill an individual to achieve his goals would also be nearly impossible to justify.

Conclusion

Special relationships are the types of relationships that necessitate unique guidelines for interacting within them. The various general ethical theories, while important and effective in guiding interactions among strangers, prove to be ineffective for handling special relationships. This is because some of the defining features of special relationships are the unique roles, duties, and obligations associated with them. This paper has shown how the consequentialist theories of direct-act utilitarianism and indirect-act utilitarianism, as well the nonconsequentialist theories of libertarianism, kantianism, and contractarianism, would handle a situation regarding a conflict based around a special relationship. First, each theory was examined which highlighted flaws the theory had when trying to address the unique characteristics of special relationships. Then, each theory was applied to a scenario from John Q to test how that theory would guide the situation described, followed by the criticisms of the application. From there it was shown how the most adequate theory, libertarianism, could be amended in order to better account for special relationships. Finally, the example scenario was reexamined using the amended theory, with the result being that although the father was acting out of concern for his son’s well being, his actions were still morally wrong. Be that as it may, this was only one step in the examination of the morality of special relationships. With further inquiry into the nature of special relationships, the theory may be refined even more, or possibly an entirely new more adequate theory may be found.

Endnotes

2 LaFollette 165-181
3 LaFollette 165-181
4 LaFollette 165-181
5 LaFollette 247-265
6 LaFollette 247-265
7 LaFollette 247-265
8 LaFollette 227-244
9 LaFollette 306-318
11 Cassavetes, John Q.
12 Cassavetes, John Q.
13 LaFollette 318-319
14 LaFollette 318-319
15 Cassavetes, John Q.
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